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Abstract
Most observers of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political situation have focused only on the problems that the 
Dayton Peace Accord created for the normal functioning of this Southeastern European state, but a workable 
solution is yet to be proposed. The Accord achieved peace by blocking any ability for effective governing 
and by diminishing the Bosnian state capacity through an excessive dispersion of power with an uncommon 
constitutional focus on internationalism, and an erroneous type of pluralism that undermines the normal 
functioning of a democracy. The solution for these problems is to be found by adjusting the procedural 
selection of the United Nations High Representative, who is the primary actor directly responsible for the 
implementation of the Accord, both in terms of the letter and intent of the document, and this paper explains 
how that change can be made and what problems it will resolve.
Key words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, internationalism, Dayton Accord, Bosnian Constitution, UN High 
Representative, Security Council, Washington Agreement, Federation, “Republic of Serbska", state capacity, 
democratization.
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The Problem with Peace
theBosnian War was concluded on November 21, 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accord initialled by all warring  parties, the significant regional and relevant international stakeholders at the time. Most observers 
have focused only on the problems that the Accord created for the normal functioning of the state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina1 (henceforth Bosnia2),  and there is an abundance of literature on this; however, a 
workable solution is yet to be proposed. The Dayton Accord did achieve peace, essentially by blocking any 
ability for effective governing and by diminishing Bosnia’s state capacity through an excessive dispersion 
of power, with an uncommon constitutional focus on internationalism and an erroneous type of pluralism 
that undermines the normal functioning of a democracy.
 A similar dispersion of power is the foundation within the United States of America’s (henceforth United 
States) political system since its inception. However, within that system, through carefully constructed and 
incrementally increased representative democracy built upon individualism, enough power eventually 
became concentrated in the institution of the President, who was then able to provide balance against the 
power of the individual states of the United States. Over time, Presidents managed to increase the United 
States’ state capacity and make a diverse country function effectively. That is why the solution for the Bosnian 
impasse is to be found on the same level, with the institution of the United Nations High Representative, 
who effectively presides over Bosnia’s political system and is the primary stakeholder directly responsible 
for the implementation of the Dayton Accord, both in terms of the letter and spirit of the document. To move 
forward, primarily within the spirit of the Accord, it is necessary to democratize the process of selecting the 
High Representative, who serves as the appointee of the United Nations Security Council in Bosnia.
1 Article I of Dayton’s Constitution indicated a change of the official name of the country by stating that “The Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the official name of which shall henceforth be ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina.’" For more, see p.45 in Szasz, Paul C. 1996. “Bosnia 
and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with annexes.” International Legal 
Materials 35 (1): 75-169.
2 For convenience, in this article we will use the single title “Bosnia” and “Bosnian state” to include “Herzegovina” as well. For further 
clarification, see footnote 14, page 40 of this Magazine.
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 It is important to note that the Dayton Accord was not only about peace, but it was also about the 
redefining of a UN-recognized country, the Republic of Bosnia. The redefining was made not only by the 
recognition and ratification of a second and smaller entity of Bosnia, named “Republika Srpska,” but also 
by changing the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia. Both of these elements of the Accord need to be 
highlighted so that the solution to the current political impasse provided here is further clarified.
 As a result of the Dayton Accord, the Republic of Bosnia turned from a unitary into a federal system 
with two never previously existent constitutive units, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Bosnian 
Federation”) and “Republika Srpska.” The first previously nonexistent unit to be hammered out was the 
Bosniak-Croat dominated “Bosnian Federation,” which effectively divided the Republic of Bosnia and 
provided the foundation for the further division of the unitary state and recognition of a Serb-dominated 
“Republika Srpska.” The “Bosnian Federation” was forged with the March 1994 Washington Agreement signed 
under the auspices of the United States. The same Agreement also proposed a confederate association 
between the Republic of Croatia and the “Bosnian Federation,” but that idea was later abandoned. 
Consequentially, the creation of the “Bosnian Federation” and the proposal of the Confederacy with Croatia 
made it politically possible for “Republika Srpska” to exist. It does not say why the suggestion of the 
confederation was necessary, but it was implicitly understood to be an effort to appease the Republic of 
Croatia, which at that time was actively fighting in the Republic of Bosnia as an aggressor, as recognized by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). That approach towards the aggressors of 
the internationally recognized United Nations member state of the Republic of Bosnia was then repeated 
with all subsequent agreements regarding the state under the auspices of the United States, the European 
Union, and the United Nations Security Council. Therefore, internationalism is an intricate part of the 
political system of Bosnia in two ways, in terms of the responsibility that the international community has 
towards the Bosnian state and people, and in terms of the ideals embedded within the current Bosnian 
constitution. Therefore, to propose a solution, Bosnian federalism and constitutional arrangements must 
first be addressed.
Federalism in Bosnia
Most commentators of the Bosnian political situation usually emphasize the problem with the Dayton Accord’s 
recognition of the Serb-dominated “Republika Srpska” as a sticking point in the normal functioning of Bosnia, 
while overlooking and ignoring the effects of the Washington Agreement which first invented the “Bosnian 
Federation” to please Croats in and around the Republic of Bosnia. It should be noted that with the Washington 
Agreement, neighboring Croatia, which took an active role in the aggression towards the UN-recognized state 
of the Republic of Bosnia, was rewarded with the creation of the “Bosnian Federation,” just as Serbia and 
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Serbs were rewarded with the creation of the “Republika Srpska,” despite their own aggression towards the 
Republic of Bosnia. It should be clearly understood that the “Bosnian Federation” was the starting point for the 
deconstruction of the unitary Republic of Bosnia and the shaping of the Dayton Accord, which subsequently 
initiated the process of diminishing the capacity of the Bosnian state. The existence of the “Bosnian 
Federation” was also further confirmed with a separate document in the Dayton Accord signed on November 
10, 1995 where it was specifically noted that the establishment of the Federation is “an essential prerequisite 
for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [and that] the responsibilities and the organization of the government 
of the Federation and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be separated [and 
that] neither government may interfere in the exclusive competence of the other government.”3 It even states, 
unequivocally, that the Government of “the Republic must now transfer functions to the Government of the 
Federation in accordance with the Federation Constitution”4 and not vice versa. Such direction again shows 
the importance of the creation of the “Bosnian Federation” with the Washington Agreement. The “Bosnian 
Federation” is referred to as a federation not because of its relations with the other smaller Bosnian entity, 
but because of its own structure composed of 10 cantons with their own governments which are united as a 
federation. The “Republika Srpska” on the other hand has its own unitary system, where local governments 
have some powers but without a system of cantons. It is important to note that for all these different levels 
of government - local, cantonal, entity, or national - there is no possibility for all citizens of Bosnia to vote 
individually and together for any officials and any government. The Bosnian citizens vote exclusively for the 
governments and elected officials of their own entity, but never together for any position, and that presents a 
problem of how to incrementally build the possibility for a common interest necessary for Bosnia to increase 
state capacity and move forward.
Internationalism and its Responsibility
Among the many contradictions concerning the common understanding of the rules regarding states’ 
sovereignty, it is important to note that the precondition set by the international community and the United 
Nations for the recognition of Bosnia as an independent state was a state-wide referendum by the people 
of that Former Yugoslav Federal unit, which was conducted in 1992. But the recognition of the “Bosnian 
Federation” and the legitimacy of “Republika Srpska” as “parties” of all subsequent peace agreements 
was provided upon aggression and war crimes committed by domestic and foreign Croatian and Serbian 
3 For more see: “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dayton agreement on implementing the 
federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with attached agreed principles for the interim statute for the city of Mostar,” in International Legal 
Materials 35 (1): 170-83, 1996. p. 172. 
4 Ibid.
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troops as confirmed by the ICTY, in spite of globally accepted international norms against the aggressions. 
These contradictions point to the inconsistent and unjust treatment of Bosnia and its legitimate organs 
of state, and suggest that international rules and understanding of what is proper could be reorganized 
and adjusted to the new realities on the ground with the purpose of providing a better path forward. Such 
an approach to international norms also shows that the international community and stakeholders have 
a responsibility towards the people and the Bosnian state to play a constructive role in its recovery in 
the spirit of the Dayton Accord. Such a responsibility towards Bosnia should also be observed through the 
relationship of the citizens of Bosnia and the international community-appointed UN High Representative, 
who, as of now, has no institutional accountability towards the people over whom he presides, because 
those people have no say in the selection of the person for that office. Obviously, then, there is a complete 
absence of responsibility towards the people of Bosnia.
The Dayton Accord as Bosnian Constitutional Ideals
As noted, the Dayton Accord also constructed a new constitution for Bosnia. Read as a whole, like many other 
Constitutions, this one, provided through the Accord, also sets a framework for a political system built upon 
big ideas and ideals. However, even for a document that should contain such high principles and ideals for 
which a society is to strive, it is unusual to read so much praise of internationalism through acceptance of 
all and any international norms regardless of local dynamics and cultures. That level of internationalism 
might be appropriate considering the tri-national nature of Bosnia, yet the lack of attention to the individual 
citizenry makes liberal democracy difficult to function properly there. The Bosnian Constitution is now 
full of acknowledgments and acceptances of every human right of all international institutions that have 
proposed any norm as a human right. So much so, that there are only a few civil rights that the citizens of 
Bosnia can enjoy apart from anyone else. With so much emphasis on the human rights conventions and 
agreements in the Constitution, the Dayton Accord’s Constitution establishes a clear preference for a model 
of a welfare state, which is to provide the possibility of the enjoyment of all such rights. Yet, there is no 
mechanism to increase the state’s capacity so it can provide what is expected from it.
 Therefore, there is no mechanism to increase the state’s capacity so it can provide the enjoyment of such 
rights. Furthermore, since the Accord’s Constitution mimics the United States’ Constitution, a fundamental 
difference should be noted, where the latter emphasizes only negative rights where the state is only a 
guard, not a provider of rights, while the former constitutes a system upon positive rights, where the state 
is to provide those rights. Although the United States’ system is built upon the principles of pluralism, 
the competition is imagined to be between interest groups or ad-hoc factions made by persons pursuing 
individual interests. Yet, in Bosnia, the constitutive groups envisioned by the Accord’s Constitution are 
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permanent and unamiable, while the individual citizen is almost irrelevant. In the United States’ system, 
an individual is to pursue happiness on their own and there is no guarantee of any group rights, while the 
Dayton Accord’s Constitution for Bosnia specifically spells out constitutive group rights and expectations 
that the state should take an active role in providing for the well-being and enjoyment of happiness of the 
individuals and the constitutive peoples as a group. Such an arrangement invites the problem of ethnic 
outbidding known to destabilize democracy, and creates democratic paradoxes where small groups often 
get overrepresented at various government institutions based on their power at any one time, and where 
the democratic principle of “one person one vote” essentially does not occur. To avoid the problem of 
ethnic outbidding, which is common for such constitutional arrangements, and to live up to that spirit of the 
Accord’s Constitution, Bosnia’s state capacity should be increased and an effective democratic mechanism 
needs to be found to do that.
 The dispersion of the powers that have prevented the tyranny of the majority that the Dayton Accord’s 
constitution effectively managed to accomplish was instrumental for peace at the time it was made, but 
it did not provide any mechanism for balancing constitutive groups and individual rights nor any tools 
to increase Bosnia’s state capacity to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. It is time to resolve these 
inconsistencies and contradictions of the Dayton Accord’s political arrangements that have now stalled the 
progress of both the peace process and the development of Bosnia’s state capacity, in order to benefit all 
of its citizens and provide a chance to fulfill the intent of the Accord in regards to the high principles of the 
Constitution. The best way to do that is through a new procedural approach to re-establish and support 
the value of the individual citizen of Bosnia as an important factor for any type of democracy, direct or 
representative, without compromising the existent power arrangements within the country.
A Possible Solution
Just as both the Washington Agreement and the Dayton Accord were “creative” and “ innovative” in terms of 
resolving the multilevel Bosnian war, it is necessary now to be creative and innovative in trying to resolve 
the impasse that the Dayton Accord has caused. Changing a constitution is a very stressful process for 
any state, and therefore the solution must be accomplished without such a difficult political step. The 
adjustment should only be made on the international level, using the existing elements of internationalism 
within the Bosnian system. Since the High Representative is provided by the United Nations Security 
Council as the highest authority directly responsible for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord 
in its entirety, the people of Bosnia, and not only the members of the Security Council, should have a say 
in who gets selected to carry that function. The proposal here is to keep the Dayton Accord Constitution 
as is and only change the procedure regarding the selection of United Nations High Representative by 
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democratizing the process of the selection, and build the possibility for the eventual transfer of the High 
Representative’s responsibilities and powers. The Annex 10.2 invites the Security Council to appoint a single 
High Representative for Bosnia. To democratize that process and increase the Representative’s democratic 
legitimacy, the Security Council should instead offer two candidates for the position and elect one, through 
a process of voting, to serve for two years, where all citizens of Bosnia will, in a state-wide election, vote for 
their preferred candidate. The Bosnian election winner will have four electoral votes, while each member 
of United Nations Security Council will have one. Bosnia’s electoral vote should then incrementally increase 
through the subsequent five election cycles, after which the citizens of Bosnia alone will select the United 
Nations High Representative from among the candidates proposed by the United Nations Security Council. 
Such a process will create an environment of equality in voting for all citizens of Bosnia with a “one-
person-one-vote” situation, regardless of a person’s other associations, which is the bedrock for pluralism 
and the liberal democracy intended by the Dayton Accord’s Constitution of Bosnia, and at the same time 
incrementally increase the state’s capacity by providing more power and democratic legitimacy to the High 
Representative in Bosnia. Finally, it is also necessary to think about the possibility and the time when the 
citizens of Bosnia themselves can be considered for the position of the High Representative as well.


